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does not factor in any conscious experience it is without meaning. Whatever insues comes, not as meant, but as the result of the mechanical interaction of physical forces. If, however, the cloud is threatening, it is by that token in a specifically functional relationship with some living being. A critic may point out the obvious fact that unknown dangers are as full of evil consequences as known dangers, and that merely knowing does not impart the dangerous character. But precisely here lies the ambiguity. Truly, consequences will follow uniformly from unforeseen as well as from foreseen events. But surely no one would confuse for a moment uniform mechanical sequence with teleological characteristics. The known danger, just in so far as known, functions to determine the attitude by which the danger is met. It may paralyze the beholder by inducing an attitude of suspense in which response is delayed, or it may by assuming a somewhat different character call forth avoidance or even resistance. This means not only that in so far as "reality," such as a storm cloud, is reduced to a sign of danger it has teleological significance, but also that until it is on this level of cognition it is non-teleological, since the purposive control is demonstrably the very essence of knowing.

With this we may contrast the position indicated by Professor Warbeke's criticism: "If, therefore, that knowledge be assumed to have a teleological purpose it must be that any reality (however pluralistically conceived otherwise) provides the basis for this interpretation. And unless some valid distinction is to be made between true-knowledge-of and actual-character-of reality the assumption of a teleology in the one involves the same for the other" (p. 214). He makes his position unmistakable by implied acceptance of Spinoza's dualistic formula that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. If this gives a correct understanding of his position, then it is Professor Warbeke rather than the pragmatist who faces the dilemma of viewing reality apart from the knowledge relationship as teleological, or else of viewing knowing itself as non-purposive. ETHEL E. SABIN.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Human Nature and its Remaking. WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1918. Pp. xxiv + 434.

The title of this work may easily lead to an erroneous classification by incautious cataloguers. The author's concern is not primarily with social changes, but with the development of the indi-

vidual. The "human nature" that is to be remade is the mass of inherited instincts and capacities; and the "remaking" is education in its largest sense. The fundamental thesis is that education in this sense is not by any means merely a social process; that, on the contrary, it is a dialectical outworking of potentialities belonging to the individual; and that these are of such a nature as to indicate, if not to prove, the contact of the individual with a supernatural power.

With respect to the instincts as such, Professor Hocking takes a position that appears to be both sound and suggestive. This is that instinctive tendencies are present in the higher, as well as in the lower, grades of the nervous hierarchy. Curiosity, for example, is such an instinct. It is dependent upon no special class of physical stimuli; it shows itself in no special set of muscular responses. Stimulus and response are describable only in terms that imply relation to mental activity. Our curiosity is excited, for example, by what is strange, not only as it meets the eye, but as it relates itself to our theories. We not only examine it attentively from the most favorable points of view, but we analyze it reflectively, classify it and explain it. If this view is correct, we make a serious mistake if we try to break up our inheritance of instincts into elements comparable to the sucking-reflex. We are by nature intelligent beings, and as such we have our characteristic native susceptibilities and modes of procedure. Curiosity is a "central instinct." Other central instincts are play, pugnacity, and fear. And, indeed, if we are to believe Professor Hocking, there is at the center of all these instincts one which is the nucleus of all our personal activities whatsoever: the "will to power."

Accordingly, while, as inherited, man's specific instincts are largely disconnected, there is in him a tendency to their intelligent integration, their gradually developing "interpretation" as factors in the totality of will. The consciousness—clear or vague as it may be—of the effectiveness of this central control of impulse Professor Hocking identifies with *conscience*. *Sin* is "the refusal to interpret crude impulse in terms of the individual's most intelligent will to power" (p. 116).

If the individualistic form of these definitions gives the reader pause, he need not fear that he has failed to catch our author's meaning. The individualism is intended. According to Professor Hocking, society, with its customs, institutions, and laws, fails to include and fails to provide for just that which is most precious in the human being. His problem, as he announces it, is "to find some way, in independence of 'society,' to an objectively valid interpretation of the human will. The case of all liberalism, of all reform, of

every criticism and likewise of every defense of any social régime, must rest in the last analysis upon the discovery, or the assumption, of such a 'true' interpretation." "If society . . . is the only or final interpreter of human nature, human nature is helpless against society . . . 'Socialization' is the last word in human development; and society is always right" (p. xi).

An adequate discussion of this position would require much space. Let it suffice to recall attention to the familiar consideration, that society too develops and by no means always knows what will permanently satisfy it. The common opposition is not so much between individual and social rights, as between partial social rights; and a solution, when it is found, consists in a fuller integration of society. The actual society, even on the most extremely socialistic grounds, must still be judged in the light of its potentialities. But, aside from the intrinsic merits of Professor Hocking's position, its consequences for philosophical inquiry must not be altogether overlooked. The philosopher is made an advocate. He is committed to the defense of a cause, the substantiation of a given set of claims; and he is assured that on the success with which this defense is carried through, the highest interests of humanity depend. What could be more unfortunate?

But let us return. Conscience, then, is not to be explained as an expression of the general will. Duty is not subjection to the preferences of others. It is not the pressure of custom, though it is generally inclined to set a value upon custom. Conscience "chooses what satisfies itself, not what satisfies the tribe" (p. 97). It accepts authoritative guidance as an economical supplementation of its own originality; but it may equally reject and oppose authority. Conscience is not even to be described as a will for the real interests of others. It is a well-considered will to power; and, "from such a will, certain ways of treating wives and friends will follow by logical necessity" (p. 122).

Professor Hocking will have nothing to do with a naturalistic theory of sin. The sinful act, according to him, implies that at the time of action the self is in some degree independent of inherited nature, of the environment, and of God (p. 124). Hence it can not be explained: to explain it would be to explain it away. But it is possible to point out conditions that lead to sin. Thus, for example, we must frequently act before deliberation can be complete; effectiveness of action may require compromise with associates; the guidance of authority is needed, yet the easy surrender of private judgment is wrong. In fact, all morality involves the risk of immorality. On the other hand, remorse for sin is one of the principal motives for righteousness. "Since we must win moral life through moral

adventure, we need to add the push of rue to the pull of the ultimate good, in order to find our adequate and complete moral motive" (p. 136).

"Sin," however, may be used to denote not an act, but the status of the agent: the condition of his preferences. The state of sin is, in part at least, a consequence of previous sinful acts; it seems also to be in some measure an original trait of our nature. What its ultimate consequence is, Professor Hocking does not profess to know; but he finds the religious belief that it involves somehow a loss of immortality, altogether reasonable. The longing for immortality he finds to be inseparable from man's self-conscious will to power: it is its "deepest expression" (p. 143). This longing has accordingly been an important factor in the moral uplift of man.

Professor Hocking returns to this theory of the necessary desire for immortality in another connection, in which he takes occasion to comment upon Professor Leuba's statistical investigation of the matter. He writes (p. 373): "One who loves life at all is forever becoming more deeply involved in it; and the self-conscious lover of life can not otherwise than will his own continuous existence. To desire the saving of one's soul in this sense is a necessary desire." And he adds in a footnote: "A fact which is not altered by the results of any questionnaire, especially of a questionnaire circulated among the more sophisticated and self-challenging members of the community." It may be doubted whether this plea is sound. A fact is, of course, presumably unaltered by the results of a questionnaire; but the conclusions of a very summary *a priori* argument may well be called in question in view of such results. Furthermore, if the desire for immortality springs necessarily from self-consciousness, we should expect to find it strongest and most unmistakable in "the more sophisticated and self-challenging" individuals.

It was remarked above that, according to our author, the inevitable course of social progress is, in its general features, given by the dialectic that is implicit in the individual. This is illustrated by the case of pugnacity. Originally it calls for *destruction*; then, since destruction leaves no victim to acknowledge defeat, it is supplanted by *revenge*—a change which "takes place quite in independence of any social restraint upon the fighting impulse" (p. 165)—but, since revenge requires the presence of the adversary, it "squints toward the maintenance of friendliness," and thus leads to *punishment*; which, in discriminating between the actual evil of character and its essential possibilities, leads inevitably to *forgiveness*. In general terms, the process is this: "The transformation of instinct, under experience, consists essentially in the series of hypotheses which a given mind adopts," with respect to the satis-

faction of the complete will; each successive hypothesis being built upon the error of the preceding one.

It should be distinctly understood that the whole success of Professor Hocking's enterprise turns upon this dialectic. The theory is central and essential to his system. To the present reviewer the mode of thinking is so foreign that sympathetic criticism of it is impossible. I recognize the ingenuity of the argument; but each swift step leaves me behind. Punishment, for example, I believe to be an exercise of authority. So far as my knowledge extends, where there is no authority, there is no punishment. But where does authority appear in the dialectic?

Professor Hocking offers "the individual life, with its natural dialectic, as the standard to which social pressures must conform" (p. 182). The social modeling of the individual is largely good and partly bad. There are many unnatural restraints and cruelties involved; but the conventions are often sound at bottom, even when superficially mistaken. Still, our author insists, it is a fact that individuals are often sacrificed to social needs, and that fixed institutional forms hamper the vital movements. Now society has no right that does not coincide with the interest of the individual—that is, with the conditions of his development. The first postulate of a good society is: "What others wish me to be must be identical with what I myself wish to be" (p. 185). What of other individuals? In a good society competition must be reconciled with common advantage; or, as Professor Hocking's second postulate reads: "Every competitive interest must be so transformed or interpreted as to be non-competitive, or an ingredient in a non-competitive interest" (p. 200). It is the indispensable function of the *state*, that it is the objective condition through which this transformation or interpretation becomes possible. To be sure a perfect society is not possible; and, on the other hand, man's highest activities are concerned with the overcoming of social maladaptations. It is requisite, however, that institutions be plastic. Postulate three accordingly reads: "Whatever in institutions tends at any time to deform human nature shall be freely subject to the force of the dissatisfaction naturally directed to change them" (p. 221). Conservatism can not be too strong—if it be not mistaken. But it may easily be mistaken. Hence a fourth postulate: "Conserving force shall be proportionate to certainty" (p. 225).

But individual life, according to Professor Hocking, not only sets the norm for all social arrangements, both of the more private and personal and of the more public and impersonal sorts. Neither love nor affairs gives full scope for the development and expression of human personality. The public appreciates only a small part of

the man; the family perceives and appreciates more, but gives it wholly insufficient exercise. There are, however, two domains—at once social and more than social—in which “*an adequate and attainable object for the human will to power*” can be found. These are art and religion. “*Art is the region which man has created for himself, wherein he can find full scope for unexpressed powers, and yet win an absolute success, in testimony of his own reality*” (p. 291). *Religion* aims at even more. Transcending the imagination, it intends to reveal an independently real world, in which all the resources of subconscious capacity—the entire self, in short—can find full and permanent freedom for development.

Here again I fail to follow. Religion has not meant to me what Professor Hocking indicates. And as for art, I can think of no human activity more thoroughly and essentially social, or, for that matter, more constrained by social limitations, than this. When Professor Hocking adds: “The artist has all that the metaphysician can give him, though it be not in conceptual form,” I can only dimly wonder what in the way of definite sense can lie behind the words. I recall similar words in *Abt Vogler*, but there I interpret them as expressing a pardonable enthusiasm—not philosophical truth.

The last part of the book is devoted to an interpretation of certain of the teachings of Jesus, which Professor Hocking conceives to be the fundamental principles of Christianity. The method employed is that which, for good or ill, has become characteristic of those idealistic thinkers who wish, on the one hand to recommend their doctrines to the larger public, and on the other hand to preserve for themselves a certain solidarity with tradition. The exposition is, to say the least, not *bien documentée*. Neither does it smack of higher criticism. It is a very well reasoned and most instructive account of what Professor Hocking would have meant by the teachings in question, had they been his own.

Asceticism, we are told, has had a certain important significance by reason of the emphasis which it has laid upon the genuine and complete satisfaction which religion gives. It is defective, however, because it is abstract—because it merely turns away from the problems set by human nature, instead of facing and solving them. This Christianity professes to do. In its teachings it consistently urges not mere self-denial but dialectic—the losing of life, by which life is gained. Every one of its maxims must be interpreted in this spirit. “Resist not evil,” means, not that pugnacity is to be eliminated, but that it is to be *aufgehoben*—taken up in, and subordinated to, a real love for the enemy. “It is sometimes necessary to induce a quiescent frame of mind,” before the appeal of non-resistance can be effective. Similarly, the identification of lust and adultery means,

not the prohibition of sex-love or of its carnal manifestations, but the transformation of it, by which it becomes a means to the freer and higher life of man and woman. Similarly again, ambition is not destroyed, but glorified. Who has been more ambitious than the great reformers and missionaries, whose aim is to save souls, to educate mankind?

This Christian ambition, as our author proceeds to observe, appears to be, in the individual who entertains it, the height of presumption. How can one pretend to save the world if he himself be not already saved. And yet Christianity calls upon him to save himself by giving himself up to the saving of others. How can Christian humility be reconciled with the impudence of preaching? Only by a divine presence in the preacher—only if it is not he that speaks and strives, but God in him. This is exactly what the Christian claims, and he claims it as a personally verified matter of fact.

From the philosophical standpoint, Professor Hocking declares in conclusion, it can only be said that such a claim is not at all preposterous; that it is in harmony with such general indications as we have of the possibilities of human nature; and that, accordingly, it may well be true.

I must confess that I do not find this conclusion altogether satisfactory; and if my own religion leanings were of the mystic type I believe I should find it even more unsatisfactory. As little as any other perception, is the mystic vision a direct and simple thing. It is not merely a passive experience but an interpretation; and I do not see that this interpretation lies outside the field of philosophy. If philosophy is intrinsically incapable of guaranteeing the interpretation, mysticism is naught but vanity.

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Some Suggestions in Ethics. BERNARD BOSANQUET. London: Macmillan & Co. 1918. Pp. vii + 248.

The title of this little book is well chosen. Dr. Bosanquet has not attempted here to give us a systematic treatment of ethical theory, but to consider merely a few more or less disconnected questions relating to both theory and practise which apparently have at times puzzled him, and which he thinks may be puzzling others. Nor is there anything dogmatic in his manner of handling these questions. The reader has the feeling that he is not so much reading a book as being permitted to listen while Dr. Bosanquet thinks aloud. Such a method of presentation has obvious merits and equally obvious disadvantages. It insures a sincere and direct